The Medical Termination Act 1971 authorizes termination of pregnancy up to 20 weeks (Section 3(2)). Mrs. X, who was about 22 weeks into her pregnancy, petitioned the Court to permit her to terminate her pregnancy after learning that the fetus had a severe medical condition of bilateral renal agenesis that may prevent it from surviving after birth, and may endanger her life during delivery.
The Court ordered verification of the petitioners’ claims by a medical board consisting of seven doctors. The report was reviewed by a doctor from the Ministry for Health who agreed with the findings. The medical board found that there was a risk of intrauterine fetal death/still birth and there was no chance of long-term post-natal survival and no curative treatment was available. The medical board further found that there was risk to the pregnant woman, as continuing the pregnancy could endanger her physical and mental health.
The Court relied upon the case of Suchita Srivastava and Anr. v. Chandigarh Administration [(2009) 9 SCC 1], where in it was held that a woman’s right to make reproductive choices is also a dimension of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court noted that a pregnant woman had the right to bodily integrity and to preserve her life if there was foreseeable danger in the case of continuing a pregnancy to term. It further noted that the report of the medical board warranted the abortion under the law, Section 3(2)(i) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971, as continuing the pregnancy would pose a risk to the petitioner’s life and a possible grave injury to her physical or mental health. The Court further noted that Section 5 of the act enables termination where not less than two doctors consider it immediately necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.
On this basis, the Court found that notwithstanding that Mrs. X was by this point approximately 24 weeks pregnant, she should be permitted to terminate the pregnancy under the provisions of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971.
The Court further recognized that the affidavit for the petition was not signed by Mrs. X but by a doctor (and fellow petitioner). While the Court found no sign of coercion, it nonetheless made clear that an affidavit from Mrs. X would be required and that the hospital would also need her consent prior to carrying out the termination.